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Thomas E. Plank
Reading Professor Baker’s article, Clearinghouse Shareholders and “No Creditor
Worse Off Than in Liquidation” Claims1 was a great pleasure. Over the years,
I have participated in colloquia with Professor Baker and discussed issues
of mutual interest, and I was delighted to have the opportunity to
comment on her article and presentation at the 2020 CLE/Symposium on
Business Law: Connecting the Threads IV, University of Tennessee
College of Law Clayton Center, on October 16, 2020. 2
Clearinghouses play an important, if less well known, part of our
economic system.3 Professor Baker’s article highlights a particularized and


Joel A. Katz Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of
Law. A.B. 1968, Princeton University; J.D. 1974, University of Maryland. I have
benefitted both professionally and financially serving as issuer’s counsel, bankruptcy
counsel, and UCC counsel for sales and securitization of mortgage loans and other
consumer and business receivables, first as a partner with Kutak Rock LLP from 1987 to
1994, then as a part time consultant for law firms, and currently as Of Counsel to Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP. The views expressed in this article are my personal views informed
by my practice experience as well as my research and analysis of the issues and are not
the views of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.
1 Colleen Baker, Clearinghouse Shareholders and “No Creditor Worse Off Than in
Liquidation” Claims, 23 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 335 (2021).
2 See Colleen Baker, Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Univ. of Okla. Price Coll.
of Bus., Clearinghouse Shareholders and “No Creditor Worse Off Than in Liquidation”
Claims at Transactions: Tennessee Journal of Business Law CLE/Symposium: Business
Law: Connecting the Threads IV (Oct. 16, 2020). I have analyzed and provided advice
on protecting clearinghouses, their members, and their members’ clients from the
insolvency risk of members or their clients, but I have not had occasion to analyze details
of a clearinghouse insolvency. I learned a great deal from Professor Baker’s presentation
and article.
3 See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 337 (showcasing clearinghouses’ role in
facilitating trades).
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important example of an age-old social problem: every commercial or
financial system includes the insolvency risk of a market participant who
does not have sufficient liquid assets to repay its creditors.4 Accordingly,
every commercial or financial system must develop insolvency and loss
allocation rules to address this problem.5
In the vast majority of transactions, the insolvency of an individual
participant, by itself, has a small effect on the overall functioning of the
economy. For many of these transactions, the United States has developed
reasonably satisfactory regimes addressing the problem of a particular
obligor having insufficient assets to repay its creditors; specifically, the
United States Bankruptcy Code, which governs liquidation or
reorganization of non-financial obligors,6 and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, which primarily governs liquidation of United States
financial institutions.7 One can quibble about particulars, but these systems
work reasonably well for most types of transactions. It is not at all
apparent, however, that the more recent Orderly Liquidation Authority8
authorizing the liquidation of “failing financial companies [other than
insured depository institutions] that pose a significant risk to the financial
stability of the United States,”9 enacted in 2010 as part II of the Dodd-

See generally id. (alluding to the risk of insolvency for clearinghouses).
See generally id. (mentioning that the Financial Stability Board has developed a set of
rules to address resolution of this problem for clearinghouses).
6 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549 (replacing
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended).
7 See 12 U.S.C. § 1811(2018). The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (the FDI Act)
authorizes the appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the FDIC) as
the sole conservator or receiver of a FDIC-insured depository institution under certain
circumstances set forth in the FDI Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (8), (9),
(10) (2018). An “insured depository institution” means “any bank or savings association
the deposits of which are insured by the [FDIC],” which includes all national banks,
federal savings banks, and federal savings associations, and almost all state-chartered
banking institutions. Id. § 1813(a)–(c). The FDIC also may be appointed as a conservator
of a failed insured depository institution, but such authority is rarely
used. See FDIC Resolutions Handbook 26 (Jan. 15, 2019), available at https://www.fdi
c.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf.
8 See id. §§ 5381–5394.
9 Id. § 5384. The Orderly Liquidation Authority provides for the appointment of the
FDIC as liquidator of a financial company if, among other criteria, “the financial
company is in default or in danger of default,” and “the failure of the financial company
and its resolution under otherwise applicable Federal or State law would have serious
adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.” Id. § 5383(a)–(b).
4
5
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Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,10 will be a
successful legislative regime for resolving the insolvency of systemically
important financial companies.
In any event, as Professor Baker’s article shows, clearinghouses are
different:11 they play an important part of the financial system; they
assume significant risks that they hedge by contract and by security
interests in liquid assets; and they are designed and organized to minimize
these risks.12 Further, unlike ordinary commercial actors that become
insolvent and are liquidated or reorganized under the Bankruptcy Code or
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, clearinghouses are much less likely to
become insolvent.13 Nevertheless, while the risks of insolvency are lower,
the consequences of insolvency are greater.14 Hence, the clearinghouse
creates the layers of protection against the risk of the insolvency of one
or more members, as described by Professor Baker.15
The particular set of protections analyzed in more detail by Professor
Baker—the allocation of losses between shareholders and non-defaulting
members of the clearinghouse, in which non-defaulting members bear
losses before shareholders bear any loss in excess of certain equity
contributions from these shareholders—presents a complicated and
apparently unique question.16 As noted by Professor Baker, in ordinary
commercial transactions, shareholders take the greater risks in exchange
for an expected greater return.17 Although the Bankruptcy Code expressly

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
11 See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 339–40.
12 See id.
13 See generally id. at 351 (discussing how clearinghouses, unlike banks, manage risk
and have different rules which can mitigate the risk of insolvency).
14 See generally id. at 346–347.(alluding to clearinghouses’ vital role in maintaining
market stability, stating “[m]ost clearing members are themselves systemically significant
institutions. . . . [t]heir financial condition would also be critical to financial market
stability . . . .”).
15 See generally id. at 343 (discussing Resolution Authority intervention for struggling
clearinghouses).
16 See id. at 349– 51(arguing that, because of the basic distinction in finance between
shareholders and creditors, shareholders should not be allowed to pass the risk of loss
onto other customers or entities).
17 See Baker, supra note 1, at 341 (noting that “[i]n the case of publicly-traded
clearinghouses, risk does not follow reward[,]” which “ . . . violates basic principles of
corporate finance.”).
10
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sanctions subordination agreements,18 I am not aware of ordinary
commercial transactions in which, ex ante, the creditors or others who deal
with an entity that becomes insolvent bear losses before the owners of the
entity. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code discourages attempts by shareholders
or other equity holders to elevate their status from their equity position to
that of creditors who would share with other unsecured creditors through
express statutory provisions, such as subordinating certain claims from the
purchase of securities of the debtor19 and codifying the absolute priority
rule for reorganization plans,20 and judicial rules, such as equitable
subordination of claims21 and the recharacterization of debt as equity.22
Accordingly, Professor Baker’s argument that shareholders should
bear the losses before non-defaulting members seems compelling. Why,
then, have clearinghouse members agreed to a regime that allocates losses
See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2018) (“A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case
under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.”).
19 See id. § 510(b) (“For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising
from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the
debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or for
reimbursement or contribution allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim,
shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or
interest represented by such security, except that if such security is common stock, such
claim has the same priority as common stock.”).
20 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); see also Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197,
201–02 (1988) (stating that “the absolute priority rule ‘provides that a dissenting class of
unsecured creditors must be provided for in full before any junior class can receive or
retain any property [under a reorganization] plan,’” (citation omitted) and holding that,
because the debtors did not qualify for the new value exception to the rule, “a
reorganization plan in which the debtors retain an equity interest in their farm is contrary
to the absolute priority rule.”); Linda J. Rusch, The New Value Exception to the Absolute
Priority Rule in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: What Should The Rule Be?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1311,
1313 (1992) (explaining that “[t]he new value exception [to the absolute priority rule]
allows the debtor's owner, the equity holder, to receive or to retain an equity interest in
the reorganized business through a contribution of new value, even if all senior claimants
are not paid in full.”).
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (providing that the court may “under principles of
equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed
claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or
part of another allowed interest[.]”); see also David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of
Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable Subordination, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 157, 198 (2003)
(discussing the standard of equitable subordination found in 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)).
22 See Paul Wallace, Simplifying the Muddled Doctrine of Debt Recharacterization, 86 MISS.
L. J. 183, 185 (2017) (distinguishing debt recharacterization and equitable subordination).
18
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to non-defaulting members before shareholders? Professor Baker
mentions some of the arguments for allocating losses in this manner. 23
Regardless of how one views those particular arguments, the history of
mandatory regulatory action in financial or commercial transaction
suggests great caution, and perhaps even skepticism, about the
effectiveness of overriding the choices of the members in the
clearinghouse marketplace, whether by positive law or on an ad hoc basis
by resolution authorities trying to rehabilitate an insolvent clearinghouse.
For example, in my view, the Bankruptcy Code, first enacted in 1978,24
has generally worked pretty well in the liquidation or reorganization of
operating companies that use equipment, goods, and other hard assets to
carry on their businesses. The Bankruptcy Code was a great improvement
over the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,25 as substantially amended by the
Chandler Act of 1938.26 However, it took a long time and a great deal of
experience to achieve the Bankruptcy Code’s substantially improved
insolvency regime.
One feature of the Bankruptcy Code is the limitation on the rights of
secured creditors of debtors in bankruptcy. For operating companies that
own and use hard assets like equipment in their business, most of these
limitations make sense. For example, if a person becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy, an automatic stay of all creditor collection actions, including
the enforcement of security interests in property owned by the debtor,
instantly arises.27 For a debtor trying to reorganize, the automatic stay
makes sense if the collateral is equipment or other assets that the debtor
needs to possess and operate in order to continue the debtor’s business;
the debtor could not reorganize if the secured creditor could foreclose on

See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 346 (discussing some arguments for shareholders
asserting NCWOL claims in resolution).
24 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
25 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
26 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978) (adding robust
reorganization provisions to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
27 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2018) (providing that the filing of a bankruptcy petition
“operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . any act to collect, assess, or recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title[.]”).
23
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and sell the equipment or other hard assets28 that the debtor needs to
continue operating the business.
In the area of receivables finance, however, the costs that the
Bankruptcy Code imposes on secured creditors who would finance
originators of mortgage loans and other receivables do not make sense. 29
As a result, beginning with the origination and financing of mortgage
loans in the 1980s in response to the savings and loan crisis and then
expanding to other types of consumer and commercial receivables, an
entirely new financial technique—securitization and structured
finance30—was developed to avoid the inefficiencies that the Bankruptcy
Code created for originators of receivables and their secured creditors.
Perhaps the most significant limitation in the Bankruptcy Code is the
automatic stay of creditor collection acts. The stay of a secured creditor
collection act makes little or no sense when the debtor is a finance
company that is in the business of making loans, or acquiring loan
28 See U.C.C. §§ 9-609(a) & 9-610(a) & (b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2013)
(authorizing the secured party after default to take possession of collateral and sell it in a
public or private sale).
29 See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Key to Securitization: Isolating the Assets to Be
Securitized from the Risk of An Insolvency Proceeding, in Offerings of Asset Backed Securities
2-1, 2-11 to 2-24 (Reed D. Auerbach & Charles A. Sweet eds., Wolters Kluwer 4th ed.
(2019)) [hereinafter Key to Securitization] (discussing the costs that the Bankruptcy Code
imposes on secured creditors of originators of receivables); Thomas E. Plank, The
Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 171, 171–80 (2013)
[hereinafter Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables] (discussing the costs that the
Bankruptcy Code imposes on secured creditors of originators of receivables); Thomas E.
Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655,
1660–71 (2004) [hereinafter Security of Securitization] (discussing the costs that the
Bankruptcy Code imposes on secured creditors of originators of receivables).
30 In a securitization, the originator or other owner of receivables that is an operating
company sells the receivables to either a trustee of a common law trust or a bankruptcy
remote special purpose entity, such as an LLC or Delaware statutory trust, whose only
function is to hold the receivables and to issue securities evidencing beneficial interests
in the receivables or debt obligations secured by the receivables. A structured finance
transaction is essentially a securitization without the issuance of securities but the
borrowing of money pursuant to a secured loan agreement. See generally Key to Securitization,
supra note 29, at 2-7 to 2-8, 2-24 to 2-80 (discussing the structuring of securitization and
how securitization and structured finance avoids the costs that the Bankruptcy Code
imposes on the secured creditors of originators of receivables); Securitization of Aberrant
Contract Receivables, supra note 29, at 180–85 (same as applied to unusual receivables such
as pay day loans and title loans); Security of Securitization, supra note 29, at 1671–83
(discussing securitization).
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obligations in return for the sale of goods, and that finances the
origination of these loans using secured credit. If the finance company
becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, it need not continue to own the loans to
liquidate or to reorganize. The automatic stay, however, prevents secured
creditors from realizing on their collateral, as described above. The
automatic stay raises the costs to the secured lenders, who must then
recoup those costs by charging higher interests rates, if possible.
In addition, the commencement of a bankruptcy case causes the
immediate acceleration of all debt,31 including secured debt. For some
types of long-term receivables, such as mortgage loans, the combination
of the automatic stay and the risk of acceleration makes the longer term
secured financing of originators of mortgage loans not feasible.32 To
finance receivables, the originators typically must sell a substantial amount
of their receivables—and in the case of mortgage loans, all of their
mortgage loans—in securitization or structured financing transactions.33

31 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2018) (providing that, if there is an objection to a claim, the
bankruptcy court shall “determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the
United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such
amount,” with some enumerated exceptions).
32 See Thomas E. Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market: The Nature of the Mortgage
Loan and Regulatory Reform, 12 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENN. J. BUS. L. 135, 142–45 (2011)
(discussing the effect of the acceleration of long-term debt secured by mortgage loans if
the finance company becomes a debtor in bankruptcy and noting that, since the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code through 2009, the percentage of holders of singlefamily mortgage loans held by persons that were not eligible for bankruptcy or that were
bankruptcy remote special purpose entities was never more than the 11.3% of all
mortgage loans (by principal balance)).
33 See discussion and sources cited supra note 30. I am currently writing a law review
article tentatively entitled “Bankruptcy Code Reform for Efficient Receivables Finance,” arguing
that the Bankruptcy Code should be reformed to eliminate these costs and therefore
eliminate the costs of structuring securitizations. The 2005 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code took a step in this direction when it added mortgage loans to the
definitions of “securities contract” and “repurchase agreement,” 11 U.S.C §§ 741(7)(A)(i),
101(47) (2018), and therefore included mortgage loans in the safe harbors that allowed
for the termination, liquidation, and acceleration of “securities contracts” and
“repurchase agreements” by one party immediately upon the bankruptcy of the other
party, id. §§ 555, 559, and the exercise of any contractual right under any security
agreement or arrangement forming a part of or related to any securities contract or
repurchase agreement, id. § 362(b)(6), (7); see generally Thomas E. Plank, Toward a More
Efficient Bankruptcy Law: Mortgage Financing Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 31 S. ILL.
U. L. J. 641, 641–68 (2007) (discussing mortgage financing under the 2005 amendments).
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Another shortcoming of the Bankruptcy Code is the treatment of
secured creditors that are under-secured. Once a person becomes a debtor
in bankruptcy, interest ceases to accrue on the unsecured debt of the
debtor.34 This rule makes sense because unsecured creditors will not
receive more than a pro rata share of the debtor’s unencumbered assets
after the payment of the administrative expenses of the bankruptcy case.
Calculating and adding interest to each unsecured claim would increase
administrative costs but would not increase the value of the property of
the debtor’s bankruptcy estate and therefore would not materially increase
any creditor’s pro rata share.
To the extent, however, that a creditor has a security interest in
collateral owned by the debtor, and the value of the collateral exceeds the
amount of the debt—for example, a $100 claim secured by assets worth
$125—the creditor is over-secured and is entitled to the accrual of interest
on the debt.35 Even though this accrual may diminish the property of the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate available for payment of the claims of
unsecured creditors, this rule makes sense. The secured creditor has a
property interest to the extent of its security interest; if the debtor wants
to continue to use the property interest of the secured creditor, it should
pay for that use.
Unfortunately, in the case of under-secured creditors––for example, a
creditor holding a $100 claim secured by assets worth $80––the creditor is
not entitled to the accrual of interest on the debt.36 Therefore, the debtor
11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2018) (providing that the bankruptcy court shall determine
and allow the amount of a creditors claim as of the date of the filing of a bankruptcy
“except to the extent that . . . such claim is for unmatured interest.”).
35 Id. § 506(b) (“To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property
the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than
the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on
such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement
or State statute under which such claim arose.”).
36 See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
382 (1988) (holding that an under-secured creditor is not entitled to interest payments
under the guise of “adequate protection” to compensate the creditor for the delays in
foreclosing caused by the automatic stay). I believe the court was correct in its
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code provisions because the allowance of interest to
over-secured creditors was an exception to the more general rule of section 502(b)(2)
disallowing all unmatured interest. But see David Gray Carlson, Postpetiton Interest Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 601–21 (1989) (criticizing the Court’s decision
and analysis in Sav. Ass’n of Texas and arguing that under-secured parties may still be able
34
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is allowed to use the property interest of the secured creditor without
paying for it. Such misappropriation of assets results in an inefficient
allocation of resources. The secured creditor should be allowed to accrue
interest on the secured claim, the $80. Although such a rule may make it
harder for debtors to reorganize, so what? If the debtor cannot reorganize
because it must pay for the use of another person’s property interest, then
it should be liquidated. The unsecured creditors, who would benefit from
a successful reorganization, should bear the costs of the debtor’s
operations.
The inability of under-secured creditors to receive the time value of
money for their secured claims imposes costs on all secured creditors that
must be passed on to future borrowers. Creditors and borrowers financing
receivables can avoid those costs through securitization and structured
finance; the secured creditors of other operating companies cannot.
Furthermore, the imposition of these costs on secured lenders that
finance the owners and operators of real estate projects makes less sense.37
Many of these secured creditors are financial institutions like banks and
savings associations that are themselves only financial intermediaries; they
borrow money primarily from depositors and lend that money to
borrowers. The combination of the automatic stay and the inability to
receive interest on under-secured debt puts an additional strain on these
financial intermediaries.
Indeed, I have often speculated that the automatic stay was a
significant contributor to the final costs of resolving the savings and loan
crisis of the 1980s.38 Many savings associations tried to survive during the
crisis by engaging in commercial real estate finance that permitted savings
association to earning higher rates of interest but at the cost of greater
risk of default. When those real estate developers filed for bankruptcy in
to show themselves entitled to post-petition interest through courts’ exercising their
discretion and applying principles of equity).
37 The Bankruptcy Code includes a minor concession to this point in creating
separate grounds for relief from the automatic stay for “single asset real estate.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(3) (2018) (allowing relief from the automatic stay unless within shorter time
period than the standard period the debtor files a reorganization that has a reasonable
possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time or the debtor pays interest on the
secured claim).
38 See Paul T. Clark, Bryan M. Murtagh, & Carole Corcoran, Regulation of Savings
Associations Under The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act Of 1989, 45
BUS. L. 1013, 1019–23 (1989) (describing the savings and loan crisis and the increased
insolvency of many savings associations).
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an attempt, allegedly, to “reorganize” their single real estate projects, the
savings associations were often unable to foreclose on their real estate
collateral quickly. A detailed study of this hypothesis would be instructive.
These problems with the Bankruptcy Code do not reflect
incompetence on the part of the individuals responsible for drafting and
enacting the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, they reflect three factors that, in
enacting any type of reform of complicated financial systems or
transactions, will be limitations of the individuals drafting and enacting
legislation and regulation: the individuals will have limited knowledge in
comparison to the cumulative knowledge of all of the actors in the market
place; the individuals will have their own interests and points of view that
will differ from those of the market participants; and, the individuals will
generally not suffer the consequences of operation of the regulatory
regime that is enacted. These limitations suggest caution and humility in
attempting to “reform” any complex financial or commercial market.
Of course, these limitations apply to almost any type of legislation and
regulation, and these limitations should not preclude good faith attempts
to address problems in the functioning of any market. Good laws and
regulations help participants function more efficiently in the marketplace,
often by allowing such participants in the marketplace to allocate risks to
those actors who are better able to ameliorate such risks. Nevertheless,
despite the excellent points made by Professor Baker, I would be reluctant
to overrule the allocation of losses of an insolvent clearinghouse to which,
ex ante, sophisticated participants in the operation of clearinghouses, the
members and the shareholders, agreed. At the very least, there should be
a strong showing that, in fact, these agreements should not be respected
because of constraints on the operation of the particular market, such as
a degree of monopoly power on the part of shareholders.

